Below are some case summaries from recent Fifth Circuit Cases regarding search and seizure and confessions.
4th Amendment Search and Seizure
U.S. v. Gray, February 1, 2012
Officers had probable cause to believe that appellant was concealing crack cocaine in his rectum. After conducting two strip searches, in which appellant was not fully cooperative, an officer told appellant that he could either undergo a third strip search, be placed in a cell with a waterless toilet or he could consent to a rectal x-ray examination. After appellant refused to consent to any of these options, officers obtained a search warrant in which appellant was forced to submit to a proctoscopic examination under sedation. A doctor eventually recovered over nine grams of crack cocaine from within appellant.
The court held that the search was unreasonable because it was demeaning and intrusive to appellant’s personal privacy and bodily integrity and that there were less invasive ways to recover the evidence, such as a cathartic or an enema. However, court held the evidence should not be suppressed because the police acted on good-faith reliance on a valid search warrant. In doing so, the court encouraged magistrates, where feasible, to hold a hearing to allow for more careful consideration of the competing interests at stake in medical procedure search cases.
U.S. v. Hernandez, February 8, 2012
Federal agents received an anonymous tip that appellant was harboring illegal aliens in her trailer. The agents conducted a knock-and–talk in which they banged on the doors and windows, with their weapons drawn, while demanding entry and then attempted a forced entry by breaking the glass on the door. When appellant answered the door, she admitted that an illegal alien was inside her trailer. Agents entered the trailer and arrested appellant and two illegal aliens. The court held that the agents’ conduct during their knock-and-talk violated the Fourth Amendment. Since a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred by the time appellant came to the door, the agents could not rely on her admission as probable cause to either enter the trailer or arrest her.
Next, the court held that the incriminating statements appellant made to the agents, after her arrest at their office, were also inadmissible. They occurred only a few hours after an egregious Fourth Amendment violation and no intervening events occurred to break the connection between her arrest and her statements.
Finally, the court held that the statements obtained from the two illegal aliens were inadmissible against appellant. The government offered nothing more than pure speculation that their statements would have been inevitably obtained but even if they had, their statements were not sufficiently separated from the Fourth Amendment violation to make them admissible.
Voluntariness of Confession
U.S. v. Cantu-Ramirez, February 6, 2012
In this multiple defendant case, appellant Lauro Grimaldo argued that the district court should have suppressed his confession because federal agents delayed in presenting him to a magistrate judge for more than two hours for the purpose of interviewing him and obtaining a confession.
The court disagreed after applying the Supreme Court’s guidance from Corley v. United States. First, because appellant’s presentment was delayed for less than six hours, his confession was admissible as long as it was obtained voluntarily.
Second, based on the totality of the circumstances, the court found that nothing about the interview indicated that his confession was involuntary. The interview lasted only ninety minutes, the agents wore casual clothing, appellant was not handcuffed and the agents offered him food and drink and allowed him to make several phone calls. The agents advised appellant of his Miranda rights and took care to ensure that he understood and voluntarily waived them. The agents obtained appellant’s confession voluntarily and it was properly admitted against him.
Showing posts with label Confession. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Confession. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 21, 2012
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
Custodial Interrogation or Friendly Chat
As I wait on more slip opinions from the Court of Criminal Appeals, I’ve been randomly sifting through Courts of Appeals opinions. Today, the 7th District Court of Appeals (Amarillo) released a rather concise opinion in an aggravated sexual assault case. It’s worth an equally concise post.
In McGee v. State, appellant complained, inter alia, that his confession should have been suppressed because he was not given Miranda warning prior to issuing his confession to the police. Unconvinced, the Court of Appeals noted that appellant signed a written document containing Miranda warnings before he began speaking with police officers. The Court went on to state that “even if the warnings afforded appellant were somehow deficient, the record contained sufficient factual basis upon which the trial court could have reasonably found that appellant was not in custody at the time.”
Here are the facts to the Court highlighted to demonstrate that appellant was not “in custody” when he gave his confession:
1) Appellant transported himself to the police station to undergo a polygraph examination and questioning;
2) Questioning occurred in a rather large 15’ by 15’ room;
3) He was never told he was under arrest;
4) He was told he was free to go at any time;
5) No one threatened him;
6) No one restrained him;
7) Those asking the questions and administering the polygraph would have stopped if appellant indicated that he wanted to leave;
8) Appellant was at the station for approximately 2.5 hours before confessing;
9) He had no marks on him to indicate that he underwent any kind of physical abuse;
10) He not only was asked if he wanted to take a break or use the bathroom but also was told that he did not have to be there before the examination began;
11) He left that station after the interview; and
12) Nothing indicates that appellant ever attempted to leave, stop the questioning, take a break, or the like.
It seems to me like the Court if stretching a bit with some of those justifications. With an apparent affinity toward list-making, the Court went on to outline scenarios that would lead them to believe a person was in “custody:”
1) If appellant was physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way;
2) If someone told him he could not leave;
3) If the officers created an environment that would lead a reasonable person to believe his freedom of movement was significantly restricted; or
4) If there existed probable cause to arrest appellant and the officers told him he was not free to leave.
The Court explained, “[h]ad any of those four scenarios arose then appellant would have been in custody, but the evidence before us allowed the trial court of legitimately conclude otherwise.”
Seems simple enough. The problem is with the trial court interpretation of those four maxims.
In McGee v. State, appellant complained, inter alia, that his confession should have been suppressed because he was not given Miranda warning prior to issuing his confession to the police. Unconvinced, the Court of Appeals noted that appellant signed a written document containing Miranda warnings before he began speaking with police officers. The Court went on to state that “even if the warnings afforded appellant were somehow deficient, the record contained sufficient factual basis upon which the trial court could have reasonably found that appellant was not in custody at the time.”
Here are the facts to the Court highlighted to demonstrate that appellant was not “in custody” when he gave his confession:
1) Appellant transported himself to the police station to undergo a polygraph examination and questioning;
2) Questioning occurred in a rather large 15’ by 15’ room;
3) He was never told he was under arrest;
4) He was told he was free to go at any time;
5) No one threatened him;
6) No one restrained him;
7) Those asking the questions and administering the polygraph would have stopped if appellant indicated that he wanted to leave;
8) Appellant was at the station for approximately 2.5 hours before confessing;
9) He had no marks on him to indicate that he underwent any kind of physical abuse;
10) He not only was asked if he wanted to take a break or use the bathroom but also was told that he did not have to be there before the examination began;
11) He left that station after the interview; and
12) Nothing indicates that appellant ever attempted to leave, stop the questioning, take a break, or the like.
It seems to me like the Court if stretching a bit with some of those justifications. With an apparent affinity toward list-making, the Court went on to outline scenarios that would lead them to believe a person was in “custody:”
1) If appellant was physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way;
2) If someone told him he could not leave;
3) If the officers created an environment that would lead a reasonable person to believe his freedom of movement was significantly restricted; or
4) If there existed probable cause to arrest appellant and the officers told him he was not free to leave.
The Court explained, “[h]ad any of those four scenarios arose then appellant would have been in custody, but the evidence before us allowed the trial court of legitimately conclude otherwise.”
Seems simple enough. The problem is with the trial court interpretation of those four maxims.
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
No Valentine's Day Present for Appellant's Girlfriend
After being convicted of aiding and abetting mail fraud and aggravated identity theft, Appellant, Lonnie Oliver Jr., challenged those convictions, arguing that federal agents illegally searched the contents of a cardboard box given to them by his girlfriend and that his statements to police officers were not voluntary.
Appellant left an unsecured cardboard box, which contained ample evidence of his identity theft operation, in the dining room of his girlfriend's apartment. When agents interviewed the girlfriend, she gave them the box, but did not tell them she had already examined its contents. The court held that the girlfriend’s search of the box destroyed Appellant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in it, and rendered the subsequent warrantless police search permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The court stated that the girlfriend’s search made the agents’ warrantless search permissible, regardless of whether the agents knew about it. The court cautioned that his holding was limited to the unique facts of this case and was not intended to expand significantly the scope of the private search doctrine.
Appellant also argued that incriminating statements he made to the agents during his custodial interrogation should have been suppressed, claiming that he had not waived his Miranda rights. After agents arrested Appellant, they advised him of his Miranda rights and provided him two forms. Appellant signed the first form acknowledging that he understood his rights, but he refused to sign the second form waiving those rights. Nevertheless, Appellant told the agents that he wished to answer their questions and he confessed to his role in a mail fraud and identity theft scheme.
The Court explained that suspect may waive his Miranda rights if the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The mere refusal to sign a written Miranda waiver does not automatically make subsequent statements by a defendant inadmissible. The court held that the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s arrest and interview established that Appellant’s waiver was voluntary, even though he refused to sign the wavier form. Specifically: (1) agents provided Appellant with a copy of the Miranda warning waiver form and read it aloud to him as he followed along, (2) Appellant expressly told the agents that although he would not sign the Miranda waiver form, he would discuss the fraud scheme, (3) Appellant never requested an attorney, (4) Appellant was articulate, coherent and not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and appeared to understand what was going on, (5) Appellant clearly understood his rights since he signed the first form that acknowledged this, and he had extensive experience with the criminal justice system, and (6) Appellant was not coerced in any way during the interview.
Appellant left an unsecured cardboard box, which contained ample evidence of his identity theft operation, in the dining room of his girlfriend's apartment. When agents interviewed the girlfriend, she gave them the box, but did not tell them she had already examined its contents. The court held that the girlfriend’s search of the box destroyed Appellant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in it, and rendered the subsequent warrantless police search permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The court stated that the girlfriend’s search made the agents’ warrantless search permissible, regardless of whether the agents knew about it. The court cautioned that his holding was limited to the unique facts of this case and was not intended to expand significantly the scope of the private search doctrine.
Appellant also argued that incriminating statements he made to the agents during his custodial interrogation should have been suppressed, claiming that he had not waived his Miranda rights. After agents arrested Appellant, they advised him of his Miranda rights and provided him two forms. Appellant signed the first form acknowledging that he understood his rights, but he refused to sign the second form waiving those rights. Nevertheless, Appellant told the agents that he wished to answer their questions and he confessed to his role in a mail fraud and identity theft scheme.
The Court explained that suspect may waive his Miranda rights if the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The mere refusal to sign a written Miranda waiver does not automatically make subsequent statements by a defendant inadmissible. The court held that the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s arrest and interview established that Appellant’s waiver was voluntary, even though he refused to sign the wavier form. Specifically: (1) agents provided Appellant with a copy of the Miranda warning waiver form and read it aloud to him as he followed along, (2) Appellant expressly told the agents that although he would not sign the Miranda waiver form, he would discuss the fraud scheme, (3) Appellant never requested an attorney, (4) Appellant was articulate, coherent and not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and appeared to understand what was going on, (5) Appellant clearly understood his rights since he signed the first form that acknowledged this, and he had extensive experience with the criminal justice system, and (6) Appellant was not coerced in any way during the interview.
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
Some Various Holdings
While I'm focused elsewhere, here's a quick look at some published holdings from around the state:
Confession Valid Despite Illegal Arrest
Monge v. State, (Tex. Crim. App.) June 30, 2010 - Providing suspect with co-defendant's confession implicating him in the crime attenuated the taint of the illegal arrest such that the suspect's later confession was not subject to exclusion.
"I'm Incompetent, I Just Can't Prove It!"
Galvan v. State, (11th Ct.--Eastland), June 17, 2010 - The defendant, who is presumed competent to stand trial, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is incompetent, and a jury finding that the defendant is compentent will not ordinarily by overturned.
Skeletons in the Closet
State v. Krizan-Wilson, (14th Ct.--Houston), June 22, 2010 - A 23-year prosecutorial delay in seeking an indictment for murder did not violate the defendant's due process rights because the delay was not an intentional device used to gain a tactical advantage over the accused or for other bad faith purposes.
Confession Valid Despite Illegal Arrest
Monge v. State, (Tex. Crim. App.) June 30, 2010 - Providing suspect with co-defendant's confession implicating him in the crime attenuated the taint of the illegal arrest such that the suspect's later confession was not subject to exclusion.
"I'm Incompetent, I Just Can't Prove It!"
Galvan v. State, (11th Ct.--Eastland), June 17, 2010 - The defendant, who is presumed competent to stand trial, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is incompetent, and a jury finding that the defendant is compentent will not ordinarily by overturned.
Skeletons in the Closet
State v. Krizan-Wilson, (14th Ct.--Houston), June 22, 2010 - A 23-year prosecutorial delay in seeking an indictment for murder did not violate the defendant's due process rights because the delay was not an intentional device used to gain a tactical advantage over the accused or for other bad faith purposes.
Friday, June 11, 2010
Police Coerce Suspect to Confess But Court Refuses to Instruct Jury Accordingly
Contreras v. State - a long opinion, but a great read.
Let me set the scene. A baby is dead. Appellant was the only person babysitting when the baby died. The police invite Appellant to make a statement. They give him his Miranda warnings and he waives. Appellant states that the baby fell off the couch, but was alive and well when he put her to bed. The medical examiner then conducts an autopsy and discovers what appears to be severe chest wounds caused by blunt force trauma. The police then invite Appellant to make another statement. They, once again, read him his Miranda warnings...this is where the story diverges.
According to the detective, during the second interview, "appellant never invoked any of his rights." Additionally, "no threats or promises were made to appellant, nor did the officers threaten any members of appellant’s family." The Appellant then confessed to murdering the baby.
On the contrary, Appellant testified that the detectives "kept yelling and jumping in, banging his hand on the desk" and "getting in Appellant's face." Appellant further testified that they threatened to blame the entire thing on Appellant's wife if he did not confess, saying "C'mon, you're not going to let your wife go to jail for something you did" and "Well, if it wasn't you, then your wife must have done it." Appellant, who wasn't under arrest at the time, then asked to speak with his family members and the detectives declined to let him go. Appellant then said, "I need to speak with an attorney," to which the detectives responded thusly:
Not willing to sweep such unconsionable interrogation tactics under the rug, the CCA reversed the judgment of the lower court, holding that the evidence did raise a fact issue regarding whether a threat to arrest and prosecute Appellant's wife rendered his confession involuntary under due process and that the trial judge should have so instructed the jury under article 38.23. The only problem now is that the CCA remanded the case back to the 8th Court for a harm analysis, so we can bet that this conviction will stand - a shallow and temporary victory for the Appellant in the interim.
An interesting side note - Presiding Judge Keller went off on a bit of a tangent on page 26 of the opinion regarding the logical disconnect between a Miranda challenge and a constitutional challenge under article 38.23. Not exactly germane to the case, but interesting nonetheless.
Let me set the scene. A baby is dead. Appellant was the only person babysitting when the baby died. The police invite Appellant to make a statement. They give him his Miranda warnings and he waives. Appellant states that the baby fell off the couch, but was alive and well when he put her to bed. The medical examiner then conducts an autopsy and discovers what appears to be severe chest wounds caused by blunt force trauma. The police then invite Appellant to make another statement. They, once again, read him his Miranda warnings...this is where the story diverges.
According to the detective, during the second interview, "appellant never invoked any of his rights." Additionally, "no threats or promises were made to appellant, nor did the officers threaten any members of appellant’s family." The Appellant then confessed to murdering the baby.
On the contrary, Appellant testified that the detectives "kept yelling and jumping in, banging his hand on the desk" and "getting in Appellant's face." Appellant further testified that they threatened to blame the entire thing on Appellant's wife if he did not confess, saying "C'mon, you're not going to let your wife go to jail for something you did" and "Well, if it wasn't you, then your wife must have done it." Appellant, who wasn't under arrest at the time, then asked to speak with his family members and the detectives declined to let him go. Appellant then said, "I need to speak with an attorney," to which the detectives responded thusly:
Come on, Saul. You’re just being selfish. We can’t let you do that. If you do that, then we won’t be able to talk to the Assistant D.A.’s on your behalf. We know you have a clean record. We know you’re a good guy. With your clean record, you’ll probably get a bond and be out by Monday, and then you can straighten all this out.Finally, Appellant testified, the officers' tactics caused him to confess:
Like I said, I was tired, exhausted. I didn’t want my wife to go to jail. I didn’t want them to take our kids away. I wanted to get out of that room. I wanted to talk to my family, and they weren’t letting me do that until I said what they were saying.Despite the conflicting nature of the testimony, the trial court refused to provide an appropriate instruction to the jury pursuant to Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides, in relevant part:
No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals instructs that "the trial court has a duty to give an article 38.23 instruction sua sponte (on its own) if 3 requirements are met:
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.
- Evidence heard by the jury raises an issue of fact (true in this case);
- The evidence on that fact is affirmatively contested (true again); and
- The contested factual issue is material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in obtaining the statement claimed to be involuntary (bingo).
Not willing to sweep such unconsionable interrogation tactics under the rug, the CCA reversed the judgment of the lower court, holding that the evidence did raise a fact issue regarding whether a threat to arrest and prosecute Appellant's wife rendered his confession involuntary under due process and that the trial judge should have so instructed the jury under article 38.23. The only problem now is that the CCA remanded the case back to the 8th Court for a harm analysis, so we can bet that this conviction will stand - a shallow and temporary victory for the Appellant in the interim.
An interesting side note - Presiding Judge Keller went off on a bit of a tangent on page 26 of the opinion regarding the logical disconnect between a Miranda challenge and a constitutional challenge under article 38.23. Not exactly germane to the case, but interesting nonetheless.
Tuesday, March 30, 2010
Cops Have No Duty to Clarify Suspect's "Vague" Request for an Attorney
Officer: "I want you to write out a statement regarding what you know about the robberies."
Suspect: "Maybe I should get an attorney for this."
Officer: ...(nothing spoken, but likely thinking to himself - "Hmm, if I don't say anything, maybe he'll forget about the attorney and give us the statement" - according to me).
Well, the Government Agent was right. The suspect entered a written confession and his statements were later used against him in his trial (and conviction) for multiple counts of bank robbery in United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. On 26 March, the 5th Circuit upheld the admissibility of his written confession and affirmed the conviction. See U.S. v. Montes.
In a concise statement of law, the 5th Circuit ensured law enforcement officers that they have no duty other than to give the minimum warnings required by Miranda:
The officers in this case testified unequivocally that the request for an attorney was “vague” and “wasn’t a demand;” [the suspect] never “affirmatively sa[id] he wanted an attorney.” Despite the suspect's contrary testimony, the district court found that since he did not clearly invoke his right to counsel, as required, his post-arrest statements made after his ambiguous request for an attorney were admissible.
Seriously, how hard would it have been for the officers to clarify whether the suspect was asking for an attorney? If you'll indulge me, let's see:
Officer: When you say that 'Maybe you need an attorney,' are you asking for an attorney?
Suspect: No (probably).
Wow, that didn't take long. After that exchange, there would be no issue at trial (or on appeal). In my mind the government should not only seek justice, but it should seek to maintain the appearance of justice. Allowing officers to simply disregard a comment by a suspect about his right to an attorney because (in the officer's mind) the statement is "vague" misses the mark on the appearance of justice.
Suspect: "Maybe I should get an attorney for this."
Officer: ...(nothing spoken, but likely thinking to himself - "Hmm, if I don't say anything, maybe he'll forget about the attorney and give us the statement" - according to me).
Well, the Government Agent was right. The suspect entered a written confession and his statements were later used against him in his trial (and conviction) for multiple counts of bank robbery in United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. On 26 March, the 5th Circuit upheld the admissibility of his written confession and affirmed the conviction. See U.S. v. Montes.
In a concise statement of law, the 5th Circuit ensured law enforcement officers that they have no duty other than to give the minimum warnings required by Miranda:
It is black letter law that when a suspect who is subject to custodial interrogation exercises his right to counsel, law enforcement officers must cease questioning until counsel is made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the officers. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1981). Generally, an invocation by a suspect of his right to counsel that is ignored by law enforcement officers requires that the suspect’s statements made after the request be excluded by the trial court. Id. If a suspect, however, makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney there is no requirement that law enforcement cease questioning. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (holding that an ambiguous reference to counsel does not invoke the right to an attorney); see also United States v. Scurlock, 52 F.3d 531, 535-37 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, the investigator conducting the questioning has no obligation to attempt to clarify the ambiguous comment of the accused. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461. Thus, “law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id.I guess if you really think about it - why would we ever want a suspect to really know what his rights are or how he can invoke them? (Insert sarcasm here). I understand that law enforcement officers are out to catch the bad guys, so naturally I would not expect them to want to assist a suspect in this area, but couldn't it be a sign that the prior Miranda warnings were not given effectively if the suspect indicates a lack of understanding?
The officers in this case testified unequivocally that the request for an attorney was “vague” and “wasn’t a demand;” [the suspect] never “affirmatively sa[id] he wanted an attorney.” Despite the suspect's contrary testimony, the district court found that since he did not clearly invoke his right to counsel, as required, his post-arrest statements made after his ambiguous request for an attorney were admissible.
Officer: When you say that 'Maybe you need an attorney,' are you asking for an attorney?
Suspect: No (probably).
Wow, that didn't take long. After that exchange, there would be no issue at trial (or on appeal). In my mind the government should not only seek justice, but it should seek to maintain the appearance of justice. Allowing officers to simply disregard a comment by a suspect about his right to an attorney because (in the officer's mind) the statement is "vague" misses the mark on the appearance of justice.
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
Officer Falsified Report to Induce Confession: CCA Reverses Conviction
Wilson v. State, NO. PD-0307-09.
In an issue of first impression (so says the majority - dissenters not convinced), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars the admissibility of a confession (to murder) if the interrogating officer fabricates documentary evidence in violation of the Texas Penal Code section 37.09 and uses it to persuade a suspect to confess.
In Wilson, a detective “knowingly creat[ed] the false document (a fingerprint test result) with the intention that defendant would consider the document as genuine and confess to shooting the victim.” Writing for the slim majority (5-4), Judge Cochran reasoned that...
See majority opinion HERE.
The dissenters (Meyers, J., and Keller, P.J., Keasler, J., and Hervery, J.) would have reversed.
Meyers (HERE) would reverse because the officer did not, in his view, violate section 37.09, because the latent fingerprints could have very well been the suspect's (and in hindsight were).
Keasler, Keller, and Hervey would reverse because the appellant did not preserve error (HERE) and because he had no standing to challenge the officer's violation of section 37.09 (HERE).
In an issue of first impression (so says the majority - dissenters not convinced), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars the admissibility of a confession (to murder) if the interrogating officer fabricates documentary evidence in violation of the Texas Penal Code section 37.09 and uses it to persuade a suspect to confess.
In Wilson, a detective “knowingly creat[ed] the false document (a fingerprint test result) with the intention that defendant would consider the document as genuine and confess to shooting the victim.” Writing for the slim majority (5-4), Judge Cochran reasoned that...
The purpose of section 37.09 is to maintain the honesty, integrity, and reliability of the justice system and prohibiting anyone–including members of the government–from creating, destroying, forging, altering, or otherwise tampering with evidence that may be used in an official investigation or judicial proceeding. Obstruction-of-justice offenses, such as tampering with evidence or government documents, address “the harm that comes from the [actor’s] disobedience of the law–damage to the authority of the government; a lessening of the public’s confidence in our institutions; public cynicism, fear, and uncertainty; and a social climate that is likely to lead to even greater disobedience."Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the "San Antonio Court of Appeals, which held that (1) the interrogating officer violated the law by fabricating a forensic report falsely stating that appellant’s fingerprints were found on the magazine clip of the murder weapon; and (2) the trial judge erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress."
See majority opinion HERE.
The dissenters (Meyers, J., and Keller, P.J., Keasler, J., and Hervery, J.) would have reversed.
Meyers (HERE) would reverse because the officer did not, in his view, violate section 37.09, because the latent fingerprints could have very well been the suspect's (and in hindsight were).
Keasler, Keller, and Hervey would reverse because the appellant did not preserve error (HERE) and because he had no standing to challenge the officer's violation of section 37.09 (HERE).
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