Mental Retardation and the 8th Amendment

In 2002, the United States Supreme Court determined that the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment bars the execution of mentally retarded persons. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  The Court reasoned that neither retribution nor deterrence could be achieved by executing mentally retarded persons and that, because mentally retarded persons have a reduced ability to participate in their own defense, there is an enhanced risk that they would be sentenced to death unnecessarily.  However, the Supreme Court left it to the individual states to determine which offenders are, in fact, retarded, in order to enforce this constitutional restriction. 

In Ex Parte Briseno, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals established non-mandatory guidelines to determine “that level and degree of mental retardation at which a consensus of Texas citizens would agree that a person should be exempted from the death penalty.” 135 S.W. 3d 1 (2004).  If an offender meets the definition of mental retardation, then the guidelines are designed to consider some more subjective criteria. The definition of mental retardation that the CCA adopted was:

(1) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, generally shown by an IQ of 70 or less, (2) accompanied by related limitations in adaptive functioning, (3) the onset of which occurs prior to the age of 18.

If a person meets that definition, the following guidelines were designed to help factfinders in criminal trials focus upon weighing the evidence as indicative of mental retardation or of a personality disorder:

Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage – his family, friends, teachers, employers, and authorities – think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, did they act in accordance with the determination?

Has the person formulated plans and carried them through, or is his conduct impulsive?

Does his conduct show leadership, or does it show that he is led around by others?

Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?

Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions, or do his responses wander from subject to subject?

Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests?

Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?

The CCA cautioned that these factors should not be considered in isolation, but rather in the context of the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in the Atkins decision. 

Last week, the CCA considered a capital murder habeas case (Ex Parte Sosa) wherein the applicant alleged that he was mentally retarded at the time of the offense.  The habeas court found that the applicant established mental retardation.  The CCA cited some inconsistencies and ultimately remanded the case back to the convicting court for the judge gather more information and consider the Briseno factors in determining whether the applicant was (or is) indeed mentally retarded.

This is an interesting area of law to me.  I've had the occasion to dig into some literature on autism recently, and at first glance it would seem that some autistic indviduals (those that are higher on the spectrum) might satisfy the factors laid out by the CCA.  Of course, the Briseno and Atkins cases deal only with the death penalty and capital punishment, but as far as retribution and deterrence go, this could be good extenuation and mitigation evidence for the factfinder to consider in other cases as well.

Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentence Affirmed

In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbids the execution of juveniles (i.e. anyone under the age of 18). At that time, the juveniles in Texas that were on death row had their sentences commuted to Life with parole. Also in 2005, the Texas Legislature amended Section 12.31(a) of the Texas Penal Code to require Life Without Parole (LWOP) sentences for capital cases in which the State does not seek the death penalty. This new LWOP provision applied to offenses committed on or after September 1, 2005.

Consequently, because juveniles could no longer be sentenced to death, all juveniles convicted of a capital crime in Texas were automatically sentenced to LWOP. In 2009, however, the legislature again amended section 12.31(a), to provide, in relevant part:

An individual adjudged guilty of a capital felony in a case in which the state does not seek the death penalty shall be punished by imprisonment in the [TDCJ] for life [i.e. with parole], if the individual’s case was transferred to the court under Section 54.02, Family Code.

The new life imprisonment (with parole) ceiling on juvenile capital offenses was not applied retroactively. The legislature specifically provided that the amendment applied only to an offense committed on or after September 1, 2009.

Chris Joshua Meadoux, the subject of a recent Court of Criminal Appeals opinion, was a juvenile capital offender sentenced to LWOP for a double murder that occurred in 2007. Unfortunately for him, his offense was committed during the 4 year window in which LWOP was the required punishment for a juvenile capital offender. He complained on appeal that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because the 2009 amendment reducing LWOP to life indicates that LWOP is a cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles. His specific arguments on appeal were:

1. Juveniles were less morally culpable (i.e. blameworthy) for their crimes than are adult offenders;
2. Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole did not serve as a measurable deterrent for juveniles; and
3. The Legislature’s recent amendment of the Texas Penal Code Section 12.31(a) to provide for life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for juvenile capital offenders signified that the evolving standard of decenecy, at least in Texas, forbade the categorical assessment of LWOP for juvenile capital offenders.

Appellant requested that his case be remanded back to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing in which life imprisonment would be the maximum penalty.

The 4th District Court of Appeals (San Antonio) held that the Eight Amendment did not bar LWOP in Appellant’s case, as his crimes were committed during the time in which LWOP was the required punishment. In its opinion of November 17, 2010, the CCA agreed, holding that:

(1) Meadoux has not established that there is presently a national consensus against imposing life without parole on a juvenile for the offense of capital murder. (2) A juvenile capital offender’s moral culpability, even if diminished as compared to that of an adult capital offender, is still great. (3) Life without parole is a severe sentence, especially for a juvenile. (4) Life without parole for juvenile capital offenders finds justification in the penological goals of retribution and incapacitation but not in the goals of deterrence or rehabilitation. Considering the balancing of these four factors, we conclude that Meaduox has not carried his burden of showing that, according to contemporary national standards of decency, the punishment of life without parole for juvenile capital offenders is grossly disproportionate to the offense.

Judge Meyers penned a dissenting opinion and was joined by Judge Johnson. They would hold that because the Legislature subsequently determined that LWOP is inappropriate for juvenile offenders, the sentence in Appellant’s case is unreasonably harsh.

I won’t make a lot of friends with my opinion of this holding, because I think the court got it right. In fact, I think the Legislature got it wrong in 2009. I believe that LWOP should still be an available punishment for juvenile capital offenders, but as an option, with life as the other alternative. We should let the jury decide whether LWOP or life is appropriate in each case. In this case, Meadoux committed a double murder and then tried to burn the bodies in a house fire to destroy the evidence. He got what he deserved.

LWOP Abolished for Juvenile Offenders in Nonhomicide Cases

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court released its opinion in Graham v. Florida, wherein it held:

The [Cruel and Unusual Punishment] Clause does not permit a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime.

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined.  Chief Justice Roberts concurred.

Writing for Justices Scalia and Alito (in part), Justice Thomas stated is his dissenting opinion:

     The Court holds today that it is “grossly disproportionate” and hence unconstitutional for any judge or jury to impose a sentence of life without parole on an offender less than 18 years old, unless he has committed a homicide.  Although the text of the Constitution is silent regarding the permissibility of this sentencing practice, and although it would not have offended the standards that prevailed at the founding, the Court insists that the standards of American society have evolved such that the Constitution now requires its prohibition.
     The news of this evolution will, I think, come as a surprise to the American people. Congress, the District of Columbia, and 37 States (but not Texas!) allow judges and juries to consider this sentencing practice in juvenile nonhomicide cases, and those judges and juries have decided to use it in the very worst cases they have encountered.

He goes on to state:

     I am unwilling to assume that we, as members of this Court, are any more capable of making such moral judgments than our fellow citizens. Nothing in our training as judges qualifies us for that task, and nothing in Article III gives us that authority.

This opinion should not make much as a ripple in Texas law, however, becuase Texas does not allow LWOP for any juvenile offense, having abolished LWOP for juvenile capital murder last year.  Even so, it's a big case for 37 other states out there.

LWOP Upheld for Juvenile Capital Murder Case

The Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio), who, by the way, issues the most aesthetically pleasing opinions, just upheld a Cruel and Unusual Punishment challenge Texas' sentencing scheme (pre-Sept 1, 2009) that imposed a mandatory life without parole (LWOP) punishment on a juvenile capital murder offender.  Meadoux v. State.

Appellant (16 years old), who was questioned for over an hour at the police station, ultimately confessed to killing his 2 friends (accidentally, of course).  The police officers never advised Appellant of his Miranda rights, maintaining that he was could terminate the "interview" and leave anytime he wished.  Accordingly, Appellant challenged, at trial and on appeal, the admission of his incriminating statement, as well as the Texas sentencing scheme of mandatory LWOP.

After a lengthy (and intriguing) recitation of the facts of the case, the Court spent another 11 pages discussing what is well-established precedent.  "Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the court's ruling" the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court that Appellant was not "in custody" and therefore, the officers were not required to read him his Miranda rights.  Furthermore, because Appellant was not "in custody" the trial court did not have to submit a question to the jury regarding whether the confession was "voluntary."

If you want a crash course on juvenile criminal procedure, including the admissibility of statements, whether an interrogation is "custodial" and whether Miranda warnings are required, check out the full text of the case here.  Justice Speedlin does an excellent job in her presentation of the law and application of the facts.  Really, in my view, it could have gone either way at the trial level, but once the trial judge has spoken, it would have been a stretch for the appellate court to deviate.

I see all of this as a side issue, because, for me (and possibly the CCA), the thrust of this case was the issue of the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP for juvenile capital murder offenders.  I hate that the Court gave such little attention to this issue (4 measly pages).  As the Court notes, the U.S. Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments on the question of whether LWOP for a non-homicide offense committed by a juvenile is "cruel and unusual." Sullivan and Graham.

I know what you are thinking... "the Supremes are only considering the constitutionality of LWOP for a non-homicide offense and they will not likely extend any opinion beyond the issue presented."  Right you are, but if (and that's a big IF) they hold that LWOP for a juvenile is unconstitutional as it applies to non-homicide offenses, we are only a small step (and a slight shift in public opinion or court ideological makeup) away from LWOP being unconstitutional for all juvenile cases.  If you'll remember, it wasn't too long ago that a state could execute a mentally retarded person.

This hardly stands to cause a big fuss in Texas, because, as you may know, Texas recently amended section 12.31(a) of the penal code which now requires a mandatory Life sentence for juvenile cases rather than LWOP.  But be on the lookout for U.S. Supreme Court opinions embracing this issue (Sullivan v. Florida and Graham v. Florida), for, while they are unlikely to affect current TX cases, they could bring on a firestorm of habeus petitions.