CCA Upholds DWI Search Warrant, Overturns Lower Courts

In a recent case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, encourages trial judges to take off the hypertechnical blinders and consider the totality of the circumstances when reviewing the propriety of search warrants and their accompanying affidavits.

State v. Jordan – (29 June 2011) Judge Womack writing for a unanimous court:

An affidavit for a search warrant to search an accused’s blood began with a statement that the officer had “good reason to believe that heretofore, on or about the 6th day of June, 2008, [the suspect] did then and there commit [the offense of DWI.] The affidavit then went on to describe the specific conduct that the suspect exhibited that gave rise to the DWI arrest. However, when describing the conduct, the officer did not state that the conduct also occurred on the 6th of June, 2008. The magistrate issued the warrant and blood was drawn indicating that the suspect had, indeed, driven while intoxicated.

At trial, the court suppressed the results of the blood test, ruling that the search warrant was deficient as it failed to allege the specific date and time the officer observed the conduct giving rise to the arrest. The 3rd District Court of Appeals (Austin) affirmed. See our prior coverage HERE.

The CCA took the time in its opinion to distinguish prior caselaw on this subject and held:

The observations of driving and intoxication described in the second part of the affidavit were the elements of the offense alleged in the first part of the affidavit (where the time of the offense was alleged). Under the circumstances of this case, it was a reasonable inference that the observations occurred on the same day that the offense was alleged to have occurred. We therefore hold that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider the totality of the circumstances contained within the four corners of the affidavit in reviewing the magistrate’s basis for determining probable cause.

The CCA went on to do some “math for lawyers” that was apparently missing at the trial level:

We also find that the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining probable cause despite the failure of the affiant to specify that time of the stop. Because the warrant was issued on June 6th at 3:54 am, less than four hours could have elapsed between the observation of the offense, and the issuance of the warrant.

Calling on the trial court (and the 3rd Court below) to focus on the totality of the affidavit, the CCA remanded the case to the trial court, where, they might just have themselves a DWI trial after all.

"Community Caretaker" Makes Unlawful DWI Arrest

In Cherokee County, Texas, a small white pickup truck "was not seen violating any traffic law or exhibiting any signs that the driver was intoxicated or otherwise in distress, when [a police officer] saw, followed, and ultimately stopped it."  According to the officer, he stopped the vehicle "to check his current state, his welfare, [and] to make sure he is okay."  After all, he had recently received a call reporting an elderly driver passed out behind the wheel of a similar vehicle in a neighboring part of town.  In checking the driver's welfare, wouldn't you know it, the officer observed signs of intoxication and arrested the driver.

At the driver's subsequent trial for DWI, he moved to suppress the evidence obtained at the stop, complaining that the officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  As the 6th District Court of Appeals (Texarkana) explained, however, probable cause may not have been required if the officer was exercising a "community caretaker" function.

In certain circumstances, a police officer may reasonably seize an individual through the exercise of the community caretaking function even without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that an offense has been committed.  As part of an officer’s duty to serve and protect, an officer may stop and assist an individual whom a reasonable person, given the totality of the circumstances, would believe is in need of help.  This exception to the warrant requirement has narrow applicability.  The community caretaking exception cannot be used if the officer is primarily motivated by a different purpose, such as law enforcement.

The problem in this case, as the Court points out, was that the driver did not objectively appear to be in distress, nor did he objectively appear to pose a danger to himself or others.  Accordingly, the Court held that the narrow community caretaker exception did not justify the officer's stop and thus, the driver's Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

See Travis v. State